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ABSTRACT
The unfavorable comparison between the obtained and expected outcomes of our choices may elicit disappointment. When the comparison is
made with the outcome of alternative actions, emotions like regret can serve as a learning signal. Previous work showed that both anticipated
disappointment and regret influence decisions. In addition, experienced regret is associated with higher emotional responses than disappoint-
ment. Yet it is not clear whether this amplification is due to additive effects of disappointment and regret when the outcomes of alternative
actions are available, or whether it reflects the learning feature of regret signals. In this perspective, we used eye-tracking to measure the visual
pattern of information acquisition in a probabilistic lottery task. In the partial feedback condition, only the outcome of the chosen lottery was
revealed, while in the complete feedback condition, participants could compare their outcome with that of the non-chosen lottery, giving them
the opportunity to experience regret. During the decision phase, visual patterns of information acquisition were consistent with the assessment
of anticipated regret, in addition to a clear assessment of lotteries’ expected values. During the feedback phase, subjective ratings and eye-
tracking results confirmed that participants compared their outcome with the outcome of the non-chosen lottery in the complete feedback
condition, particularly after a loss, and ignored the non-realized outcome of the chosen option. Moreover, participants who made more visual
saccades consistent with counterfactual comparisons during the feedback period anticipated regret more in their decisions. These results are
consistent with the proposed adaptive function of regret. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s web-site.
key words decision making under risk; regret; eye-tracking; neuroeconomics
INTRODUCTION
When we choose among alternatives, we may have the op-
portunity to compare the consequences of our choices with
the consequences of non-chosen options. The unfavorable
comparison between obtained and foregone outcomes can
generate error signals, called regret following the economics
(Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982) and psychology tradi-
tion (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000),
or fictive errors (Lohrenz, McCabe, Camerer, & Montague,
2007) in neuroscience literature. Regret and disappointment
are experienced in response to an unfavorable outcome of a de-
cision, and both are related to a process of counterfactual think-
ing in which the obtained outcome is compared with an
outcome that might have been (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, &
Manstead, 1998). Counterfactual thinking influences individ-
uals’ emotional reactions—in terms of valence and intensity—
to outcomes and events (Boles & Messick, 1995; Kahneman
& Miller, 1986). Several aspects may differentiate regret and
disappointment. According to Zeelenberg et al. (1998),
whereas regret is related to behavior-focused counterfactual
thought in which the decision maker’s own actions are the ele-
ments of the counterfactual, disappointment is related to
situation-focused counterfactual thought in which aspects of
the situation are changed. Contrary to disappointment, regret
is associated with a feeling of responsibility and may have a
more important role in learning to evaluate our actions
(Camille et al., 2004).
Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov (1999) designed the “regret
gambling task,” to study the effect of feedback information
about the outcome of foregone alternatives on the evaluation
of the obtained outcome. In the partial feedback condition,
where only the feedback of the chosen lottery was provided,
emotional ratings increased with the obtained outcome and
decreased as a function of the chosen lottery’s unobtained
outcome (i.e., intra-lottery comparison), thus characterizing
the disappointment effect. A win (e.g., of $8) was perceived
as more pleasurable when compared with a missed loss (e.g.,
of $32) rather than a missed larger gain (e.g., of $32). In the
complete feedback condition, the obtained outcome was
compared with that of the unselected lottery (i.e., inter-lottery
comparison), and this counterfactual comparison modulated
self-reported emotional responses, interpreted by the author
as reflecting a regret effect. Camille et al. (2004) replicated
these findings using the same task and showed that the influ-
ence of regret on outcome evaluation was amplified com-
pared with disappointment. Moreover, regret was associated
with stronger emotional arousal, as indexed by skin conduc-
tance responses, than disappointment. In addition to regret
and disappointment effects, Camille et al. (2004) reported
an effect of the non-realized outcome of the chosen gamble
in the complete feedback condition (disappointment in re-
gret). Therefore, in the complete feedback condition, two ref-
erence points can be taken into account in the evaluation of
an outcome: the outcome of the non-chosen lottery and the
non-realized outcome of the chosen lottery. If both types of
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counterfactual outcomes do influence the subjective evalua-
tion of one’s decision outcomes, then amplified feeling of re-
gret in the complete condition might simply be interpreted as
an additive effect of regret and disappointment. This may run
counter to the interpretation of the amplified feeling of regret
as a distinct learning signal; interpretation that holds only if
the first type of counterfactual outcome is taken as a refer-
ence point. It is not straightforward, however, to disentangle
the differential effects of both forms of missed outcomes on
the subjective evaluation of the obtained outcome. From this
perspective, investigating the pattern of visual inspection of
the lotteries during the feedback period may prove useful to
infer the underlying processes of outcome evaluation (Johnson,
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Willemsen, 2008).
We used a similar lottery task with partial and complete
feedback in combination with eye-tracking to investigate,
on the one hand, the link between fixations and choice
behavior during the decision phase and, on the other hand,
fixations on obtained and forgone outcomes during the feed-
back phase. In the vein of recent research in the field of deci-
sion neuroscience, we based our work on the assumption that
visual attention plays an active role in shaping emotional ex-
periences and in constructing decisions (Orquin & Mueller
Loose, 2013). We describe decision processes considering
the nature and the pattern of visual information acquired by
participants, as measured by eye-tracking. To our knowl-
edge, this is the first study investigating patterns of informa-
tion acquisition related to the anticipation of regret in
decision under risk.
Two different visual attention patterns are possible de-
pending on whether the emotional amplification of regret is
due to a feeling of responsibility or to an additive effect of
disappointment and regret. In the first case, we hypothesize
that when the outcome of the non-chosen lottery is revealed,
in the complete feedback condition, this monetary amount
will be attended longer than in the partial feedback condition.
Concomitantly, the attention toward the non-realized out-
come of the chosen lottery will be reduced. By contrast, the
additive hypothesis would require no change in visual atten-
tion toward the non-realized outcome of the chosen lottery in
the complete feedback condition compared with the partial
feedback condition, and possibly no difference between the
two forms of counterfactual information.
When considering decision mechanisms, Camille et al.
(2004) proposed a model of choice that incorporates antici-
pated regret and disappointment in addition to maximizing
expected earnings. This approach has been successful in
explaining choices in several other datasets (Coricelli et al.,
2005; Larquet, Coricelli, Opolczynski, & Thibaut, 2010;
Simioni et al., 2012). Anticipating regret versus evaluating
expected values (in order to maximize earnings) in choices
implies several differences in terms of visual patterns of in-
formation acquisition. To evaluate the expected values of a
lottery pair, one will integrate information related to the mon-
etary payoffs and respective probabilities of a single lottery
and then switch to the other lottery. This was for instance
the pattern of looks-up related to choices in Glöckner and
Herbold (2011) and in the easy condition of Arieli, Ben-Ami,
and Rubinstein (2011). In that study, when the computation
of the expected value was easy, participants attended the pro-
spective payoffs and associated probabilities of each lottery
separately. By contrast, the regret theory states that anticipating
regret relies on the computation of a relative utility function.
The utility associated with an option from a choice set depends
not only on the expected consequences of that option,but also
on those of the alternative options (refer to section on
“Theoretical framework: behavioral and attentional pattern
of regret-based decision making”). Thus, we hypothesize
that anticipating potential regret will require one to make
more comparisons between lotteries and especially to com-
pare the lowest monetary amount of each lottery with the
highest amount of the other. The aim of the study was also
to provide important insights into the role of experienced
emotions in modulating attention in subsequent choices,
thus providing the first evidence of the role of regret-driven
attention in decision making. We hypothesize that the more
participants attend the outcome of the non-chosen lottery,
the more they will anticipate regret in subsequent choices.
Theoretical framework: behavioral and attentional pattern
of regret-based decision making
Experienced utility (outcome phase of the choice process)
We consider a decision maker who observes both the out-
come obtained from his or her choice and the counterfactual
outcome, an outcome he or she could have had alternatively.
The difference between these two terms defines a relative ex-
perienced utility. The relative experienced utility captures the
importance of the comparison of the obtained outcome ver-
sus the counterfactual outcome. How important relative ex-
perienced utility is for the well-being of the decision maker
potentially depends on the nature of the counterfactual out-
come. Our experimental paradigm allows us to distinguish
between the role of chance and personal responsibility. In
the partial feedback condition, a counterfactual outcome is
the outcome that the decision maker would have had by a dif-
ferent resolution of uncertainty. Disappointment is elicited
by the unfavorable comparison between the obtained and
non-realized outcomes of the chosen lottery. In the complete
feedback condition, however, a counterfactual outcome is
what he or she could have had with a different choice, in ad-
dition to the obtained outcome. Results from previous studies
(Camille et al., 2004) showed that (i) counterfactual compar-
ison influence outcome evaluation in both partial and com-
plete feedback conditions and (ii) the regret effect in
complete feedback condition is more intense than disappoint-
ment in partial feedback condition (i.e., amplification effect).
Decision utility (decision phase of the choice process)
To evaluate lotteries ex ante, before choice is made, a deci-
sion maker will anticipate the future disappointment associ-
ated with a bad resolution of the chosen option and the
future regret associated with a bad decision. As disappoint-
ment is elicited by the unfavorable comparison between a de-
cision outcome and non-realized outcomes of the chosen
option, anticipated disappointment may be related to the
distance between the possible outcomes of the considered
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option. Regret is elicited by the unfavorable comparison be-
tween a decision outcome and the outcome of a rejected
alternative option. Whereas future disappointment is evalu-
ated by considering the elements of the attended lottery only,
anticipating future regret involves comparing the possible
outcomes of all available options. As a consequence, antici-
pating disappointment and regret in choice will require
different attentional patterns of information integration. Spe-
cifically, taking into account future regret in decision will
translate in making more comparisons between the possible
outcomes of different options, thus more inter-lottery saccades.
Effect of experienced regret on decision utility
Experienced and decision utilities are strongly linked. The
main hypothesis is that the experience of regret will result
in more anticipation of this emotion during subsequent
choices. To verify this hypothesis, we tested the effect of ex-
perienced regret in early trials on choice behavior (i.e., antic-
ipation of regret) in late trials of our experiment.
Behavior and visual attention
We state the following hypotheses for correspondence be-
tween behavioral and eye-tracking effects in the context of
a choice between two lotteries: (i) after the outcomes of both
lotteries are revealed, greater attention is paid to the outcome
of the unchosen lottery than to the non-realized outcome of
the chosen lottery (i.e., the amplification effect is associated
with more attention toward the counterfactual outcome of
the unchosen lottery). This concerns the personal responsibil-
ity effect, which states that the counterfactual comparison is
more important in the case of personal responsibility rather
than chance. Intuitively, the subject is more affected in terms
of relative utility if the counterfactual comparison is due to
his or her choice rather than simply pure chance. (ii) During
the decision phase, regret-based choices induce more inter-
lottery comparisons (transitions of visual attention from one
lottery to another). (iii) The experience of regret after feed-
back induces anticipation of regret in subsequent choices,




Twenty healthy adults (11men and ninemen,Mage =22.5 years,
age range: 19–25years) with normal vision participated in the
study approved by the French National Ethical Committee.
Participants were recruited through advertising posters in uni-
versities in Lyon.
Task
A lottery task was used, manipulating the magnitude and
probabilities of potential gains and losses. Subjects repeat-
edly chose between two lotteries, with the aim of maximizing
their earnings. Each lottery had two possible outcomes from
the set of values {20; 5; +5; +20} with probabilities of
the first outcome taken from the set {.2; .5; .8}. We ensured
that the difference in expected values of the two lotteries of
all pairs did not exceed 7 euros, so none of the two lotteries
clearly dominated the other (Table S1).
The highest possible outcome of each lottery was always
positioned on the left side and the lowest possible outcome
on the right side. To control for stimuli saliency, the colors
used to depict the potential outcomes and their respective
probabilities (orange and blue) had comparable saturation
(169 and 173, respectively) and luminance (130 and 136).
To ensure discrimination of visual fixations on the diverse el-
ements of the lotteries, the digits representing the possible
wins and losses were separated from each other, and from
the sector on the circle representing the associated probabil-
ity, with an angle of 9°.
Experimental procedures
Participants underwent 80 trials in two successive sessions.
Two sequences of trials were undertaken by each participant:
one sequence with partial feedback (40 trials) and one with
complete feedback (40 trials). Eleven participants experi-
enced the partial feedback condition first, and nine partici-
pants started with the complete feedback condition. In the
partial feedback condition, only the outcome of the chosen
lottery was revealed to the participant; in the complete feed-
back condition, the outcome of both the chosen and non-
chosen lotteries were revealed at the same time. Participants
thus had the opportunity to compare their outcome to what
they could have obtained, had they chosen the alternative
lottery.
At the beginning of the trial, two lotteries were displayed
(Figure 1). The subject could choose one of the two lotteries
at any time by pressing one of two arrow keys on a keyboard
(self-paced). After the participant had made their choice, they
saw their choice for 2 seconds, then an arrow spinning for
5 seconds, and the outcome for 3 seconds. At the end of the
trial, the participant was asked to provide a subjective emo-
tional rating on the outcome of their choice (i.e., “How do
you feel about the outcome of your choice”) on a scale from
50 (extremely negative) through 0 (neither positive nor
negative) up to +50 (extremely positive). Trials were sepa-
rated by a 5-second black screen.
Payments
Participants were financially motivated. So as to avoid partic-
ipants mentally summing their earnings and to incentivize
them to treat trials independently, participants were told that
the results of 10 randomly selected trials would be summed
at the end of the experiment and that they would receive this
amount in addition to a 5-euro show-up fee. The French Na-
tional Ethical Committee required that all participants re-
ceived the same monetary compensation; therefore, they
were paid 15 euros at the end of the experiment. At the end
of the experimental session, participants were debriefed
regarding the goals of the study and the use of deceptive
monetary incentive. In order to avoid any transmission of
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knowledge about the deceptive payment procedure be-
tween participants, we recruited them in various universi-
ties building across Lyon, and we did not include




Choice behavior was analyzed based on panel data analysis,
using the statistical software package STATA (StataCorp,
College Station, TX, USA). We ran mixed (panel data) logit
regressions, which took each participant as the unit and the
trial as time, and estimated both random and conditional
fixed effects. Parameters were estimated by maximum
likelihood.
Given that Pr(g1) = 1Pr(g2), where Pr(g1) and Pr(g2)
are the probabilities of choosing lottery 1 and lottery 2, re-
spectively, we defined the probability of choosing g1 in terms
of three factors affecting the choice: expected value (dEV),
anticipated regret (r), and anticipated disappointment (d).
x1, y1 and x2, y2 are the two possible outcomes of the first
(g1) and second (g2) lotteries, respectively, with x1> y1,
and x2> y2. The probability of x1 is p, and the probability
Figure 1. (A) Example of two lotteries presented at the beginning of the trial. The portions of each arc represent the probability associated with
the payoffs depicted in the square box above each portion. Here, the left lottery has a 50% chance of earning 5 euros and a 50% chance of
losing 20 euros. The right lottery has a 20% chance of earning 20 euros and an 80% chance of losing 20 euros. Probabilities can take values
{.5, .2, .8}, and payoffs can take any value within {20, 5, +5, +20}.The dotted lines represent the AOIs considered for the analyses, one
large AOI for each lottery one for each monetary amount and for each probability wheel. (B) Distribution of fixation points on the chosen and
non-chosen lotteries during the decision period, weighted by the fixation duration, for all trials and participants. The fixation points are plotted
on one example pair of gambles: 58.74% of the total number of fixations occurred in the monetary amounts AOIs and 23.20% in the wheels
AOIs. (C) Distribution of fixation points on chosen and non-chosen lotteries, obtained and non-realized outcomes during the feedback period,
weighted by the fixation duration, for all trials and participants. OC, obtained-chosen; NRC, non-realized-chosen; ON, outcome-non-chosen;
NRN, non-realized-non-chosen. Of the fixations, 34.27% occurred in the monetary amounts AOIs and 48.10% in the wheels AOIs; 5.60% of
the fixations were located in the place of the future location of the emotional scale, in anticipation of its appearance
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of y1 is (1p). The probability of x2 is q, and the probability
of y2 is (1q).
The model is Pr(g1t) =F [dEVit, rt, dt], where t is time. We
ran a mixed-effect logistic regression to estimate the proba-
bility of the participant choosing lottery 1, as a function of
the difference in expected value (dEV), anticipated regret
(r), and disappointment (d), such as
Pr c ¼ 1 dEV ; r; djð Þ ¼ 1
1þ e αþβ ·dEV þ γ · rþ δ ·dð Þ
The dependent variable, “choice of g1,” is 1 when the sub-
ject chooses g1 and 0 when the subject chooses g2. Indepen-
dent variables are d, r, and dEV. The difference in expected
value when choosing g1 is defined as
dEV ¼ EV1  EV2
¼ p ·x1 þ 1 pð Þy1½   q ·x2 þ 1 qð Þy2½ 
A positive (negative) and significant expected value (dEV)
coefficient indicates that subjects consistently choose the lot-
tery with the highest (lowest) expected value.
Anticipated disappointment when choosing g1 is defined as
d ¼ d2  d1
¼ y2  x2j j 1 qð Þ½   y1  x1j j 1 pð Þ½ 
Anticipated regret when choosing g1 is defined as
r ¼ y2  x1j j  y1  x2j j
Anticipated regret is based on the consideration of a pos-
sible choice alongside the rejection of its alternatives. The
process of minimizing the anticipated regret (denoted as r)
consists of rejecting the lottery associated with the highest re-
gret propensity, when comparing the lowest outcome of this
lottery and the highest outcome of the alternative lottery.
Positive coefficients for r and d indicate that subjects con-
sistently anticipated (minimized) regret and disappointment,
respectively. To detect multicollinearity, we computed the
variance inflation factor of the model. The mean variance in-
flation factor is 2.04 (range 1.68–2.63), suggesting very low
variance inflation.
Anticipated disappointment depends on the spread out of
the lotteries’ possible outcomes, which is similar to a mea-
sure of risk propensity. We also report a regression in which
anticipated disappointment is replaced by a more conven-
tional measure of risk. Risk propensity when choosing g1 is
defined as
dsd ¼ sd1  sd2
¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi




q x2  EV2ð Þ2 þ 1 qð Þ y2  EV2ð Þ2
q
The mean variance inflation factor of this model is 1.21
(range 1.13–1.26).
We also tested the hypothesis that participants anticipate
regret more for pairs of lotteries with a smaller difference
in expected values. We estimated with a mixed-effect logistic
regression the probability of choosing the lottery, minimizing
regret as a function of |EV1EV2|.
Following this analysis, we categorized trials into regret-
driven and dEV-driven decisions. We first isolated lottery
pairs for which dEV and r had opposite signs, meaning that
maximizing expected values or minimizing regret results in
opposite choices. Among these pairs of lotteries, a trial was
considered as regret driven when participants chose the lot-
tery associated with the lowest potential regret and with the
lowest expected value. The rest of the trials—when partici-
pants maximized expected values regardless of regret (in-
cluding pairs of lotteries for which dEV and r had the same
sign)—were categorized as dEV-driven trials.
Affective report analyses
We compared how combinations of obtained and foregone
outcomes modulated mean affective ratings in the two condi-
tions, partial and complete feedback, during the feedback
phase. Events were classified according to their feedback
condition and to whether or not the participant experienced
a relative loss or a relative gain. Trials were categorized as
relative gain trials if the counterfactual comparison was ad-
vantageous and as loss trials if it was disadvantageous, re-
gardless of the sign of the obtained outcome. In the partial
feedback condition, the participant could experience disap-
pointment in case of relative loss, that is, when the obtained
outcome is worse than the non-realized outcome of the se-
lected lottery, or joy in case of relative gain, when the ob-
tained outcome is better than the non-realized outcome of
the selected lottery (i.e., intra-lottery comparison). In the
complete feedback condition, where information about the
outcome of the non-chosen lottery is available, the partici-
pant can experience regret when the obtained outcome is
worse than the outcome of the unselected lottery or relief
when the obtained outcome is better than the outcome of
the unselected lottery (i.e., inter-lotteries comparison). In ad-
dition, with complete feedback, comparison between the ob-
tained outcome and the non-realized outcome of the chosen
lottery is still possible (intra-lottery comparison). The latter
event will be considered in the analyses.
We used the following labels in our analyses: the obtained
outcome of the chosen lottery is labeled OC and the non-
realized outcome of the chosen lottery is NRC. In the partial
feedback condition, NRN1 and NRN2 are the two possible
outcomes of the non-chosen lottery (with NRN1>NRN2).
In the complete feedback condition, ON is the outcome of
the non-chosen lottery and NRN the non-realized outcome of
the non-chosen lottery.
The statistical analyses were conducted with the statistical
software package STATA (StataCorp; Release 9/SE). Non-
parametric tests were applied to the datasets because the data
violated several parametric assumptions, particularly distri-
bution normality as the affective scale is truncated. The sig-
nificance of the difference between behavioral variables,
such as subjective evaluations, is estimated with the Wilcoxon
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signed-rank test (WSRT, nonparametric test); the hypothesis
tested is that the distribution of two random variables for
matched pairs is the same. A mixed linear regression was run
in the complete feedback condition (800 observations) to con-
firm results from comparison of mean affective ratings. This re-
gression took the affective rating in each trial as the dependent
variable and the obtained and non-realized outcomes of the
chosen lottery as well as the outcome and non-realized out-
come of the non-chosen lottery as predictors.
Eye-tracking recordings and analyses
We used the video-based Tobii 1750 eye-tracker with a
1280×1024 pixel screen. The table-mounted camera and
IR light system perform a 50-Hz sampling rate acquisition
and computes position for both eyes. Participants were sitting
approximately 50 cm from the screen, and their head was free
of movement. A pre-analysis using CLEARVIEW software
(ClearView 2.6.0 analysis software 2007, Tobii AB,
Danderyd, Sweden) divided eye movements into fixations
and saccades. Fixation points were defined as gaze pause
when remaining within a 30×30 pixel square for at least
40milliseconds. Fixation points accounted for 67.9% of all
data points. Additional analysis steps were performed with
MATLAB MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA. Parametric tests
were applied because the data did not violate parametric
assumptions. We focused on the decision (self-paced) and
feedback (3 seconds) periods. The trajectories and fixation
points were grouped in pre-defined areas of interest (AOIs)
corresponding to stimulus regions. We defined one AOI for
each entire lottery, plus one for each of the four monetary
amounts, and one for the wheel representing the probabilities
of obtaining the potential outcomes (Figure 1B and C). For
decision and feedback events, we considered the number of
fixations on each AOI, that is, the number of times the gaze
entered the AOI and the total fixation time for each AOI. A
fixation may include several fixation points within the same
AOI; however, fixation times and the fixation point count
are highly redundant measures. As fixation times might be
more informative of the information extraction process, the
number of fixation points will be not considered in the study.
For the decision periods, in addition to comparing the total
fixation times, we investigated the information acquisition
pattern by computing a transition matrix. The purpose of this
matrix is to describe the main patterns of transition between
the AOIs by computing the relative frequencies of these tran-
sitions. For each AOI i, the number of transitions—defined as
two successive fixations—from that AOIi to each of the other
AOI was computed. The relative frequency of transition was
computed by dividing the number of transition from AOIi to





Participants evaluated their outcome more negatively in the
regret events (i.e., OC<ON in the complete feedback con-
dition, average rating=21.40, SEM=2.51) than in the
disappointment events (OC<NRC in the partial feedback
condition, average rating=17.35, SEM=1.96; WSRT,
Z=1.941, p< .05, Cohen’s d= .40). No difference was found
between the relief (OC>ON in the complete feedback condi-
tion, average rating=24.78, SEM=2.15) and rejoice (OC>
NRC in the partial feedback condition, average rating=24.59,
SEM=2.07) events. Following Camille et al. (2004), we
looked at specific pairs of obtained/unobtained outcomes to
confirm that the regret effect was not driven by a difference
in mean gains and losses between the partial and complete
feedback conditions (Figure 2). In the partial feedback condi-
tion, a loss of 5 euros was perceived as more unpleasant and
a gain of the same value as less pleasant when the non-realized
outcome from the same lottery (NRC) was a gain of 20 euros
instead of a loss of 20euros (WSRT, Z=3.921, p< .001,
d=1.50, for 5 obtained; Z=3.702, p< .001, d=1.31, for
+5 obtained). In the complete feedback condition, emotional
reactions were strongly modulated by the outcome of the
unchosen alternative (ON), showing the effect of regret
(WSRT, Z=3.823, p< .001, d=1.65, for 5 obtained;
Z=3.823, p< .001, d=1.64, for +5 obtained). Direct compar-
isons between the two feedback conditions revealed that an
unobtained outcome of 20euros resulted in more negative
emotional ratings in the complete feedback condition (WSRT,
Z=2.535, p< .05, d= .58, for 5 obtained; Z=2.375, p<
.001, d= .90, for +5 obtained), reflecting more intense feelings
of regret than disappointment. A linear regression in the com-
plete feedback condition (number of observations=800, Wald
χ2 =3067.65, p< .0001) revealed that subjective ratings im-
proved with the obtained outcome (OC, β =1.39, p< .001)
and worsened with both the non-realized outcome of the cho-
sen lottery (NRC, β =.18, p< .001) and the outcome of the
non-chosen lottery (ON, β =.52, p< .001). The effect of
the non-realized outcome of the non-chosen lottery (NRN)
was not significant (β =.04, p= .337). Note that the effect
of ON on subjective ratings is almost three times higher than
that of NRC. Given that NRC and ON show a relatively high
Figure 2. Affective ratings in the partial and complete conditions. In
the partial condition, the mean affective ratings of the obtained out-
come of the chosen lottery (OC) are depicted as a function of the
non-realized outcome of the chosen lottery (NRC). In the complete
condition, it is depicted as a function of the outcome of the non-chosen
lottery. Error bars stand for standard error of the mean
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correlation, it is difficult to draw any conclusion on the effect
of NRC in the complete feedback condition or, put differently,
on the role of disappointment in regret situations, based on the
analysis of subjective ratings alone. We thus turned to eye-
tracking data to investigate whether participants will still attend
the NRC outcome in the complete feedback condition.
Eye-tracking
After the outcome of the lotteries had been revealed, partici-
pants fixated on the chosen lottery longer (M=1365.25milli-
seconds, SEM= 71.64) and more often (M=1.86, SEM= .04)
than the non-chosen one (total fixation time: M=628.17mil-
liseconds, SEM= 44.83; number of gaze entries into AOI:
M=1.18, SEM= .05). A two-way analysis of variance re-
vealed a main effect for choice (chosen versus non-chosen
lottery, total fixation time: F(1, 19) = 147.21, p< .001, d=
1.68; number of gaze entries into AOI: F(1, 19) = 398.59,
p< .001, d=1.73), a main effect for the condition (only sig-
nificant for the number of gaze entries into AOI: F(1, 19) =
57.19, p< .001, d=1.34) and a significant interaction be-
tween choice and feedback condition (total fixation time:
F(1, 19) = 56.65, p< .001; number of gaze entries into
AOI: F(1, 19) = 36.81, p< .001). In the complete feedback
condition (M=854.12milliseconds, SEM= 42.55), partici-
pants looked at the non-chosen lottery twice as long as in
the partial feedback condition (M=402.22milliseconds,
SEM= 47.11), and this difference was highly significant
(t(19) = 8.84, p< .001, d=1.49).
Results from emotional ratings suggest that regret is elic-
ited by the comparison between the obtained outcome and
the outcome of the non-chosen lottery. Eye-tracking data
confirmed the importance of the outcome of the non-chosen
lottery for outcome evaluation (Figure 3). Under both feed-
back conditions, participants primarily looked at their ob-
tained outcome (OC) the longest. In the partial feedback
condition, they looked at the non-realized outcome of the
chosen lottery (NRC: M= .78, SEM= .07) more often than
at the two possible outcomes of the other lottery (NRN1:
M= .55, SEM= .06; t(19) = 3.28, p< .005, d= .70; and
NRN2: M= .49, SEM= .05; t(19) = 4.67, p< .001, d= .93).
The difference in total fixation time between NRC and both
NRN1 and NRN2 was significant (t(19) = 2.54, p< .05,
d= .59; and t(19) = 3.77, respectively, p< .001, d= .78), but
there was no difference between fixation times for the two
non-realized outcomes of the non-chosen lottery (p= .198).
The distribution of fixation times on the monetary amounts
was very different in the complete feedback condition. Par-
ticipants attended their obtained outcome most (OC, number
of gaze entry into AOI: M=1.12, SEM= .07), with the sec-
ond most attended outcome being that of the non-chosen
lottery (ON, number of gaze entry into AOI: M= .95,
Figure 3. Total duration of fixations on the four outcomes in partial and complete conditions during the feedback phase. The four monetary
amounts are categorized depending on their relevance for the participant after the outcome of the chosen (in the partial feedback condition),
or both lotteries (complete feedback condition) have been revealed. The values shown on the bars represent the proportion of trials with at least
one fixation in the AOI. OC, obtained-chosen; NRC, non-realized-chosen; ON, outcome-non-chosen; NRN, non-realized-non-chosen. In the
partial feedback condition, NRN1>NRN2. OC, NRC, and ON can take any value within {20, 5, +5, +20}, depending on the participant’s
choice and on the result of the lotteries. Error bars stand for standard error of the mean
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SEM= .06). They looked more often at ON than NRC
(M= .57, SEM= .05; t(19) = 4.69, p< .001, d=1.22) and
NRN (M= .61, SEM= .05; t(19) = 7.03, p< .001, d=1.15),
and they spent significantly more time looking at ON than
at NRC (t(19) = 4.90, p< .001, d=1.22) and NRN (t(19) =
8.96, p< .001, d=1.27). NRC was fixated in only 45% of
the trials, whereas ON was fixated in the 78% of the trials
(t(19) = 6.26, p< .001). This is contrary to the partial feed-
back condition, in which the number of discrete fixations
(p= .313) and fixation time (p= .746) on NRC was not higher
than the fixation time on NRN, suggesting that participants
stopped attending the non-realized outcome of the lottery
they had chosen when the feedback from the other lottery
was available. This finding runs counter to the argument that
the unobtained outcome of the chosen lottery (NRC) has a
real impact on subjective ratings in complete feedback condi-




Participants took more time to make their choice in the com-
plete feedback condition (M=5.72 seconds, SEM= 1.79)
than in the partial feedback condition (M=5.25 seconds,
SEM= 1.51; t(19) = 2.02, p< .05, d= .28). They chose ac-
cording to the expected values of the lotteries (Table 1, the
coefficient for dEV is positive and significant). In addition,
anticipated regret and disappointment were predictive of
choices. Importantly, the effect of anticipated disappointment
on decisions was significant in the partial feedback condition,
but it was not in the complete feedback condition. Note,
however, that directly testing the interaction between the
feedback condition and regret or disappointment did not re-
veal a significant effect. In the complete feedback condition,
the significant negative interaction between dEV and r sug-
gests that the probability of minimizing regret increased
when the difference in expected values between lotteries de-
creased. This effect was confirmed by a logit mixed-effect re-
gression (Wald χ2 = 95.09, p< .001, β=.228, p< .001). In
other words, participants relied more on anticipated regret as
a decision variable when the lotteries were harder to discrim-
inate on the basis of their expected values. The results were
very similar when considering risk propensity instead of an-
ticipated disappointment (Table S2).
Eye-tracking
During the decision phase, participants mainly looked at the
four monetary amounts and at the intersection between the
different portions of the wheel representing the probabilities
(Figure 1B). They looked at each monetary amount 2.58
times (SEM= .18) for 655.94milliseconds (SEM= 58.28)
on average per trial. Each probability wheel was fixated on
1.90 times (SEM= .14) for 429.06milliseconds (SEM=42.68).
They looked more often and longer at the lottery they were
about to choose (number of gaze entries into AOI: M=3.02,
SEM= .19; total fixation time inside the AOI: M=2.34 sec-
onds, SEM= .18) than at the subsequently rejected lottery
(number of gaze entries into AOI: M=2.71, SEM= .18; dura-
tion: M=1.83 seconds, SEM= .14), and this difference was
significant (number of gaze entries into AOI: t(19)= 12.80,
p< .001, d=1.05, time spent inside the AOI: F(1, 19)=
123.92, p< .001, d= .43).
Visual inspection strategies of available information may
reveal how dEV and r are computed as decision criterions.
Particularly, considering the expected value of a lottery re-
quires that all parameters of a lottery are sequentially
inspected before moving the attention to the other lottery.
By contrast, anticipating regret requires more comparisons
between lotteries, especially between the lowest monetary
amount of one lottery and the highest of the other lottery.
Thus, given that choices were mainly driven by dEV, we hy-
pothesized that subjects would inspect amounts and probabil-
ities within each lottery in every trial (intra-lottery saccades).
However, as choices were significantly modulated by antici-
pated regret as well, they displayed a secondary stereotypic
visual pattern related to the evaluation of anticipated regret,
which assumes more saccades between lotteries.
The transition matrix in Figure 4A shows the probability
of participants looking from a particular AOI to any other
AOI. Cells were not independent within each row (χ2(30) =
Table 1. Mixed logistic regression analysis modeling choices in the partial and complete feedback conditions
Variables
Partial feedback Complete feedback
Coeff SE z p Coeff SE z p
Diff in expected values (dEV) .1519 .0303 5.02 <.001 .1886 .0312 6.04 <.001
Anticipated disappointment (d) .0225 .0098 2.29 .022 .0148 .0100 1.47 .140
Anticipated regret (r) .0278 .0067 4.15 <.001 .0309 .0068 4.53 <.001
Interaction dEV× r .0033 .0023 1.41 .159 .0053 .0024 2.17 .030
Interaction dEV× d .0045 .0026 1.7 .088 .0022 .0026 .83 .408
Interaction d× r .0007 .0004 1.72 .086 .0003 .0004 .64 .521
Interaction dEV× r × d .0001 .0002 .4 .690 .0000 .0002 .05 .961
Constant .1785 .1109 1.61 .107 .0025 .1092 .02 .981
Log likelihood =501.75923 Log likelihood =494.20136
Wald χ2(7) = 91.35 Wald χ2(7) = 101.98
Prob> χ2 = .0000 Prob> χ2 = .0000
The probability of choosing the left lottery over the right one is estimated as a function of the difference in expected values between the two lotteries, anticipated
regret and disappointment. The regression includes the interactions of these three variables with one another.
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12 549.69, p< .0001), suggesting that participants displayed
consistent visual patterns. Three patterns emerged from this
matrix. First, there were many transitions within lotteries,
from x to y, y to x, and x or y to the associated probability.
Second, participants preferentially explored elements of the
lotteries from left to right, first x1 and then y1, x2, and y2. Fi-
nally, we observed some saccades consistent with regret
evaluation, with transitions from y1 to x2 and from x2 to y1.
The transition matrices were very similar in the two condi-
tions, partial and complete feedback.
In order to further investigate the visual pattern of infor-
mation acquisition, we defined three eye-tracking variables,
the total number of explored AOI during the decision phase
of a trial, and the ratio of inter-lottery and intra-lottery sac-
cades. Including those variable in our model of choice did
not yield to significant results, possibly because of the much
larger effect of dEV compared with r and d on decisions.
Thus, we adopted an alternative approach. We compared
regret-driven decisions, where participants chose the lottery
associated with minimal regret and with the lowest expected
value (20.8% of the decisions), with expected value driven
trials, where participants chose the lottery associated with
the highest expected value (79.2% of the decisions). We
tested the hypothesis that participants will attend monetary
amounts more than probabilities and make more inter-lottery
comparisons when making decisions driven by regret. The
number of number of entries into any AOIs was greater for
trials in which decision was driven by regret (M=16.6,
SEM= .5) than for trials in which decision was driven by ex-
pected values (M=14.5, SEM= .2, t=4.12, p< .001,
d=1.10). This suggests that a conflict between the two deci-
sion criterions (dEV vs. r) may be quantified by additional at-
tentional exploration. Our model of choice predicts that
regret-driven decisions are associated with inter-lottery com-
parisons of monetary amount whereas dEV-driven decision
involves saccades within lotteries. To control for the differ-
ence in number of fixations between the two types of deci-
sions, we compared the ratio of inter-/intra-lottery saccades
between dEV and regret-driven choices. As predicted, regret-
driven decisions involved a higher ratio of inter-/intra-lottery
saccades (M= .51, SEM= .017) than dEV-driven decisions
(M= .48, SEM= .007; one-tailed t=1.786, p< .05, d= .49;
Figure 4B). This result supports the idea that decision makers
anticipate regret by comparing the potential outcomes of the
different options, as opposed to attributing a value to each lot-
tery independently from the alternative options.
Relationship between attention (eye-tracking data) and
behavior (choice data)
Regret theory proposes that comparing the outcome of a de-
cision with the outcome of alternatives has a learning value.
This entails that participants will seek counterfactual infor-
mation more after a loss than after a gain and that it will
affect their choice behavior. Participants, indeed, looked
more at the outcome of the non-chosen lottery (ON) on aver-
age when their choice yielded a negative outcome (OC<0,
M=252.11milliseconds, SEM= 16.85) than when it yielded
a positive outcome (OC> 0, M=206.60milliseconds, SEM=
18.62; t(19) =2.95, p< .01, d= .56). This result was confirmed
by the mixed linear regression reported in Table 2, which
shows, on a trial by trial basis, that decreasing obtained out-
come increases the fixation duration on the outcome of the
non-chosen lottery. In addition, we found a significant correla-
tion between the total fixation duration on ON and individuals’
r coefficients extracted from the choice regression in complete
trials (r= .54, p< .05), suggesting that participants who made
more counterfactual comparisons during the feedback period
are those who minimized regret the most when choosing.
Effect of experienced regret on the visual attentional pattern
in subsequent choices
We also observed a change in visual inspection pattern over
time. When we split the sample of eye-tracking data acquired
during choices into early (first 20 trials in each feedback
Figure 4. (A) Transition matrix. Each line corresponds to the starting AOI and each column to destination AOI. Numbers in the cells correspond to
the proportion of transitions from the starting AOI to the destination AOI. Transitions relevant for the assessment of dEV and anticipated regret are
indicated in blue and green, respectively. (B) Ratio of between and within lotteries saccades in expected value and regret-driven choices. When
minimizing regret rather than maximizing expected value, participants made more inter-lottery saccades. Error bars stand for standard error of
the mean
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condition) and late (last 20 trials in each feedback condition)
trials, we observed that the result previously reported in
Figure 4B—that is, that minimizing regret rather than maxi-
mizing expected value is associated with a higher inter-/
intra-lottery saccade ratio—only holds in late trials (t(19) =
2.03; p< .05, d= .57). The difference in saccades type be-
tween EV-driven and regret-driven trials was not significant
for early trials (t(19) = .14, p= .44). This suggests that the in-
formation acquisition pattern changes during the course of
the experiment. After participants experienced regret (in
early trials), they started (in late trials) examining the choice
options by making more saccades between lotteries in an at-
tempt to minimize future regret.
DISCUSSION
Our study builds on recent efforts to use eye-tracking method-
ology, in conjunction with choice behavior analyses, to better
capture the complexity of decision processes (Franco-Watkins
& Johnson, 2011; Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; Knoepfle,
Wang, & Camerer, 2009; Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010;
Krajbich &Rangel, 2011).We investigated how different deci-
sion variables, such as expected values and anticipated regret
and disappointment, are evaluated and drive choices between
lotteries. In particular, our goal was to test whether visual atten-
tion patterns were consistent with the predictions of our deci-
sion model based on regret theory.
During the decision period, we observed a fixation bias
toward the chosen lottery, which is consistent with previous
eye-tracking results with binary choices (Krajbich et al.,
2010; Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003). Analy-
ses of choice behavior and visual pattern of information ac-
quisition showed that participants seemed to primarily
compare expected values of lotteries to make their choices,
replicating previous findings (Fiedler & Glockner, 2012). In-
deed, the most common visual pattern was to first look at all
information (monetary amounts and probabilities) of one lot-
tery and then switch to the other one. Nevertheless, antici-
pated regret modulated decisions as well, especially for
those lottery pairs with small differences in expected values.
In trials for which participants did minimize regret in their
decision, they made more inter-lottery comparisons than
when their decision was driven by expected values. This
study thus provides evidence for a regret-related attentional
pattern in decision making.
The feedback phase revealed fixation patterns clearly con-
sistent with experienced regret during outcome evaluation. In
the partial feedback condition, in which no information re-
garding the outcome of the non-chosen lottery is provided,
participants mainly looked at the non-realized outcome of
the lottery they had selected. In the complete feedback condi-
tion, participants spent a substantial amount of time looking
at the outcome of the non-chosen lottery and disregarded
the non-realized outcome of their lottery. These observations
confirm that two distinct counterfactual outcomes serve as
comparison points depending on the type of feedback pro-
vided. The visual exploration patterns are in accordance with
subjective evaluation measures. In the partial feedback con-
dition, the affective evaluation of the obtained outcome was
modulated by the value of the non-realized outcome of the
chosen lottery. In the complete feedback condition, the affec-
tive evaluation of the obtained outcome was modulated by
the value of the outcome of the non-chosen lottery. This
modulation was stronger in the complete feedback condition
than in the partial one—the amplification effect—which is
the signature of regret in this task.
Previous studies (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al.,
2005) showing that the non-realized outcome of the chosen
lottery has no effect on subjective evaluation have received
important criticisms. The first criticism is that statistically
disentangling the effect of the two types of counterfactual
outcomes (the non-realized outcome of the chosen lottery
and the outcome of the non-chosen lottery) on emotional rat-
ings may be difficult. In a regret situation for instance, if the
participant loses 20, both missed outcomes will be higher
than the obtained outcome. This makes it difficult to ascer-
tain that only the outcome of the non-chosen lottery, and
not both counterfactual outcomes, modulates emotional rat-
ings of the obtained outcome, in the complete feedback con-
dition. Second, emotional and attentional processes can have
different effects. Even though the non-realized outcome of
the chosen lottery does not have any impact on emotional rat-
ings, it could still be attended by participants and have a
learning value (i.e., influence subsequent choices). Our
model proposes an adaptive function of the emotion of re-
gret; nonetheless, changes in choices behavior could happen
outside of these emotional mechanisms. Therefore, the best
way to address these criticisms is to investigate attentional
patterns. The present eye-tracking results provide additional
insights for the interpretation of the subjective evaluation re-
sults. We show here that in the complete feedback condition,
participants do attend the outcome of the non-chosen lottery,
all the more if their obtained outcome is a net loss. By con-
trast, the non-realized outcome of the chosen lottery is only
attended in the partial condition and ignored in the complete
Table 2. Mixed linear regression: the fixation time on the outcome of the non-chosen lottery (ON) is estimated as a function of the obtained
outcome (OC) and non-realized outcome of the chosen lottery (NRC)
Fixation duration on ON Coefficient Standard error z p 95% confidence interval
OC 1.3770 .4885 2.82 .005 2.3345 .4195
NRC .5356 .4713 1.14 .256 1.4594 .3881
Constant 230.0886 15.3424 15.00 <.001 200.0181 260.1590
Wald χ2 = 8.01; Prob> χ2 = .0182; complete trials
Participants looked more at the outcome of the non-chosen lottery (ON) when their obtained outcome (OC) decreased. The effect of the non-realized outcome of
the chosen lottery (NRC) was not significant.
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feedback condition. Thus, eye-tracking data provide evi-
dence that the non-realized outcome of the chosen lottery
does not influence the way participants evaluate their out-
come when the non-selected lotteries are resolved. These
results are important to show that we can ignore disappoint-
ment in regret because both the subjective ratings and eye-
tracking data converge to the same findings.
These results are consistent with the proposed adaptive
function of regret (Foster & Vohra, 1999; Foster & Young,
2003; Hart, 2005; Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000; Megiddo,
1980): information about the outcome of rejected options
serves as feedback on aptness of choice and as a learning sig-
nal to make better choices in the future. Therefore, in the
complete feedback condition, participants attend counterfac-
tual outcomes of the non-selected option more than those of
the selected option, because the former provide more useful
information from a learning perspective. Consistently with
this hypothesis, the eye-tracking data showed also that
participants looked more for counterfactual information
(i.e., outcome of the non-chosen lottery) in trials when they
obtained a negative outcome. Additionally, participants
who made more counterfactual comparisons during the feed-
back period relied more on anticipated regret in their deci-
sions, also confirming the adaptive role of regret. These
findings have important theoretical implications. Indeed,
they show a hierarchy of counterfactual outcomes, with the
outcome of the unchosen alternative weighted the most, thus
demonstrating the relevance of theories, such as regret theory
(Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982), which focus mainly
on the outcome of alternative choices as the counterfactual
term, and theories of learning in games (Hart & Mas-Colell,
2000) based on regret. Those theories integrate the counter-
factual term in a rational model of decision making.
Several eye-tracking studies showed that decision maker
do not rely on the deliberate computation of expected values
(Arieli et al., 2011; Glöckner & Herbold, 2011). Nonethe-
less, whether decision makers spontaneously make use of
heuristics and show attentional patterns consistent with these
heuristics is subject to debate (Orquin & Mueller Loose,
2013). Combining econometrics and eye-tacking methods
allowed us to better characterize the decision processes in-
volved in choices among lotteries. Individuals based their
partially decisions on expected values. However, when the
available options were difficult to discriminate based on their
expected values, participants relied more on anticipated re-
gret, and those decisions involve a pattern of attention con-
sistent with the predictions of our model of choice.
In many real-life decisions, we have the opportunity to
learn about the outcome of alternative choices, and our
results suggest that this is salient information. Indeed, partic-
ipants spent almost as much time looking at the counterfac-
tual outcome as at their own outcome. Our results suggest
that when the outcomes of non-chosen options are observ-
able, counterfactual comparisons are deeply integrated in
the decision process. Regret signals are pervasive in decision
making; they are not simply biasing decisions, but they are
fundamental constructs of the decision-making process.
Therefore, reinforcement learning models would benefit
from incorporating a regret component, both at the stage in
which the value function is updated though prediction error
signals and at the stage in which the probability on actions
is computed (Coricelli & Rustichini, 2010).
Interestingly, our data show that the experience of regret
affected the way in which participants acquired visual infor-
mation in subsequent choices; in particular, they increased
the amount of inter-lottery saccades (transitions) in late trials.
These findings provide evidence for a dynamic interplay be-
tween emotions and attention in decision making. Thus, a
specific pattern of attention characterizes the experience of
regret during unfavorable outcomes, and then in turn experi-
enced regret affects the pattern of visual information acquisi-
tion in subsequent (regret avoidance) choices. Unfortunately,
we failed to uncover a clear link between attentional patterns
and future choices on a trial by trial basis. We believe that the
stronger effect of expected values comparison compared with
anticipated regret on choices made it difficult to characterize
this link. Future studies should ensure to keep the difference
in expected values between choice options very small to bet-
ter identify regret mechanisms. Furthermore, more research
will be needed to characterize the precise mechanisms of re-
gret learning, that is, how the experience of regret shapes fu-
ture choice behavior.
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